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Abstract
People may be surprised by noticing certain regularities that hold
in existing knowledge they have had for some time. That is, they may
learn without getting new factual information. We argue that this
can be partly explained by computational complexity. We show that,
given a database, ﬁnding a small set of variables that obtain a certain
value of R2 is computationally hard, in the sense that this term is
used in computer science. We discuss some of the implications of this
result and of fact-free learning in general.
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1“The process of induction is the process of assuming the sim-
plest law that can be made to harmonize with our experience.”—
Wittgenstein (1922)
1 Introduction
Understanding one’s social environment calls for the collection of informa-
tion (or data) and for ﬁnding regularities in these data. Many theoretical
models of learning focus on learning new facts, on their integration in an
existing database, and on the way they modify beliefs. Within the Bayesian
framework the integration of new facts and the modiﬁcation of beliefs is done
mechanically according to Bayes’s rule. However, much of human learning
h a st od ow i t hﬁnding regularities that, in principle, could have been de-
termined using existing knowledge, rather than with the acquisition of new
facts.1 In this paper we model regularities in database and explain the diﬃ-
culty in ﬁnding them.
The immediate consequence of this diﬃculty is that individuals typically
will not discover all the regularities in a database, and may overlook the most
useful regularities. Two people with the same database may notice diﬀerent
regularities, and may consequently hold diﬀerent views about a particular
issue. One person may change the beliefs and actions of another without
communicating new facts, but simply by pointing to a regularity overlooked
by the other person. On the other hand, people may agree to disagree even if
they have the same database and are communicating. We elaborate on these
consequences in Section 4.
For illustration, consider the following example.
Ann: “Russia is a dangerous country.”
1To consider an extreme case, assume that an agent follows a mathematical proof of a
theorem. The knowledge she thus acquires has always been, in principle, available to her.
Yet, mathematics has to be studied.
2Bob: “Nonsense.”
Ann: “Don’t you think that Russia might initiate a war against
a Western country?”
Bob: “Not a chance.”
Ann: “Well, I believe it very well might.”
B o b : “ C a ny o uc o m eu pw i t he x a m p l e so fw a r st h a te r u p t e d
between two democratic countries?”
Ann: “I guess so. Let me see... How about England and the US
in 1812?”
Bob: “OK, save colonial wars.”
Ann: “Well, then, let’s see. OK, maybe you have a point. Per-
haps Russia is not so dangerous.”
Bob seems to have managed to change Ann’s views. Observe that Bob has
not provided Ann with any new factual information. Rather, he pointed out
a regularity in Ann’s database of which she had been unaware: democratic
countries have seldom waged war on each other.2
Why has Ann failed to notice that the democratic peace phenomenon
holds in her own database? It appears most likely that it has simply not
occurred to her to categorize wars by the type of regime of the countries
involved. For most people, wars are categorized, or “indexed”, by chronology
and geography, but not by regime. Once the variable “type of regime” is
introduced, Ann will be able to reorganize her database and observe the
regularity she has failed to notice earlier.
Yet, fact-free learning is not always due to the introduction of a new
variable, or categorization, that the individual has not been aware of. Often,
one may be aware of all variables involved, and yet fail to see a regularity
2In the ﬁeld of international relations this is referred to as the democratic peace phe-
nomenon. (See Russett (1993), Maoz and Russett (1992, 1993), and Maoz (1998).)
3that involves a combination of such variables. Consider an econometrician
who wants to understand the determinants of the rate of economic growth.
She has access to a large database of realized growth rates for particular
economies that includes a plethora of variables describing these economies in
detail.3 Assume that the econometrician prefers fewer explanatory variables
to more. Her main diﬃculty is to determine what set of variables to use
in her regression. We can formulate her problem as determining whether
there exists a set of k regressors that give a particular level of R2.T h i si sa
well-deﬁned problem that can be relegated to a computer software. However,




= O(mk) regressions. When m and k a r eo fr e a l i s t i cm a g n i t u d e ,i ti s
impractical to perform this exhaustive search. For instance, choosing the





≈ 7 ∗ 1015 regressions. On a computer that can perform 10
million regression analyses per second, this task would take more than 22
years.
But linear regression is a structured and relatively well-understood prob-
lem. One may hope that, using clever algorithms that employ statistical





subsets. Our main result is that this is not the case. Formally, we
prove that ﬁnding whether k regressors can obtain a pre-speciﬁed value of
R2, r, is, in the parlance of computer science, NP-Complete.4 Moreover, we
show that this problem is hard (NP-Complete) for every positive value of
r. Thus our regression problem belongs to a large family of combinatorial
problems for which no eﬃcient (polynomial) algorithm is known. An impli-
3As an example of the variety of variables that may potentially be relevant, consider the
following quote from a recent paper by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny
(1998) on the quality of government: “We ﬁnd that countries that are poor, close to
the equator, ethnolinguistically heterogeneous, use French or socialist laws, or have high
proportions of Catholics or Muslims exhibit inferior government performance.”
4In Section 3 we explain the concept of NP-completeness and provide references to
formal deﬁnitions.
4cation of this result is that, even for moderate size data sets, it will generally
be impossible for the econometrician to know the trade-oﬀ between increas-
ing the number of regressors and increasing the explanatory power of those
regressors.5
Our interest lies not in the diﬃculties facing social scientists, but in the
problems encountered by nonspecialists attempting to understand their envi-
ronment. That is, we wish to model the reasoning of actual economic agents,
rather than of economists analyzing data. We contend, however, that a prob-
lem that is diﬃcult to solve for a working economist will also be diﬃcult for
an economic agent. If an econometrician cannot be guaranteed to ﬁnd the
“best” set of regressors, many economic agents may also fail to ﬁnd it.6
Economic agents, as well as social scientists, do not generally look for the
best set of regressors without any guiding principle. That is, they do not en-
gage in data mining. Rather, they espouse and develop various theories that
guide their search for regularities. Our econometrician will often have some
idea about which variables may be conducive to growth. She therefore need
not exhaust all subsets of k regressors in her quest for the “best” regression.
By contrast, our model does not capture the development of and selection
among causal theories. Yet, even the set of variables that the econometri-
cian deems relevant according to her theory is typically large enough to raise
computational diﬃculties. More importantly, if the econometrician wants to
test her scientiﬁc paradigm, and if she wants to guarantee that she is not
missing some important regularities that might cause a paradigm shift and
unveil new causal theories, she cannot restrict her attention to the regressors
she has already focused on.
In conclusion, while computational complexity is not the only reason
for which individuals may be surprised to discover regularities in their own
5In particular, principle components analysis, which ﬁnds a set of orthogonal compo-
nents, is not guaranteed to ﬁnd the best combination of predictors (with unconstrained
correlations).
6We support this claim in Section 4 below.
5databases, it is one of the reasons that knowledge of facts does not imply
knowledge of all their implications. Hence computational complexity, along-
side unawareness, is among the reasons that make fact-free learning a rather
common phenomenon.
In the next section we lay out our model of individuals’ databases. In this
context we discuss several notions of regularities and the criteria to choose
among them. The diﬃculty of discovering satisfactory sets of regressors is
proven in Section 3. In the last section we discuss the result, its implications
and related literature.
2 Regularities in a Data Base
An individual’s database consists of her observations, past experiences, as
well as observations that were relatedt oh e rb yo t h e r s .A na s s u m p t i o nt h a t
greatly simpliﬁes the discussion is that observations are represented as vectors
of numbers. An entry in the vector might be the value of a certain numerical
variable, or a measure of the degree to which the observation has a particular
attribute. Thus, we model the information available to an individual as
a database consisting of a matrix of numbers, where rows correspond to
observations (distinct pieces of information) and columns to attributes.
We show below a fraction of a conceivable database pertinent to the de-
mocratic peace example. Rows correspond to observations in the database,
and columns the attributes. The value in a given entry represents the de-
gree to which the attribute (column) holds for the observation (row). (The
numbers are illustrative only.)
Observation M1 M2 D1 D2 T W
WWII7 .7 1 1 0 0 1
Cuban missile crisis 1 1 1 0 1 0
1991 Gulf war 1 .3 1 0 1 1
7We refer here to England’s declaration of war on Germany on September 3, 1939.
6Mi — how strong was country i?
Di —w a sc o u n t r yi ad e m o c r a c y ?
T — was it after 1945?
W —d i dw a rr e s u l t ?
The democratic peace regularity states that if, for any given item the at-
tribute W assumes the value 1, then at least one of the attributes {D1,D 2}
does not assume that value. (More precisely, this is the contrapositive of the
democratic peace regularity.)
It is important to observe that this model is highly simpliﬁed in several
respects. For instance, it assumes that the individual has access to a complete
matrix of data, whereas in reality certain entries in the matrix may not be
known or remembered. The model implicitly assumes also that all variables
are observed with accuracy. More importantly, in our model observations
are already encoded in a particular way. For instance, in this matrix above
country “1” is always the democratic one. But, when representing a real-life
c a s eb yar o wi nt h em a t r i x ,o n em a yn o tk n o ww h i c hc o u n t r ys h o u l db e
dubbed “1” and which — “2”. This choice of encoding is immaterial in the
democratic peace phenomenon, because this rule is symmetric with respect
to the countries. If, however, we were to consider the rule “a democratic
country would never attack another country”, encoding would matter. If the
encoding system keeps country “1” as a designator of a democratic country
(as long as one of the countries involved is indeed a democracy), this rule
would take the form “if D1=1then A1=0 ”, where Ai stands for “country
i attacked”. If, however, the encoding system does not retain this regularity,
t h es a m er u l ew i l ln o tb ea ss i m p l et of o r m u l a t e .I nf a c t ,i tw o u l dr e q u i r ea
formal relation between variables, allowing to state “For every i,i fDi =1
then Ai =0 ”. Since such relations are not part of our formal model, the
model would give rise to diﬀerent regularities depending on the encoding
system. Indeed, ﬁnding the “appropriate” encoding is part of the problem
of ﬁnding regularities in the database. We abstract from this problem here,
7and assume that the database is already encoded in a way that suggests the
relevant regularities.
We will prove that despite all these simplifying assumptions, it is hard to
ﬁnd regularities in the database. It follows that ﬁnding regularities in real
databases, which are not so tidy, is an even harder problem.
The democratic peace phenomenon is an example of an association rule.
Such a rule states that if, for any given observation, the values of certain
attributes are within stipulated ranges, then the values of other attributes
are within prespeciﬁed ranges. Association rules are used in data mining (see,
e.g., Hastie et al. (2001)). An association rule does not apply to the entire
database: its scope is the set of observations that satisfy its antecedent. It
follows that association rules diﬀer from each other in their generality, or
scope of applicability. Adding variables to the antecedent (weakly) decreases
the scope of such a rule, but may increase its accuracy. For example, we may
reﬁne the democratic peace rule by excluding observations prior to the ﬁrst
world war. This will eliminate some exceptions to the rule (e.g., the War of
1812 and the Boer War) but will result in a less general rule.
As e c o n dt y p eo fr e g u l a r i t yi safunctional rule: a rule that points to a
functional relationship between several “explanatory” variables (attributes)
and another one (the “predicted” variable). A well-known example of such
a rule is linear regression, with which we deal in the formal analysis. All
functional rules on a given database have the same scope of applicability, or
the same generality. Yet, when diﬀerent rules are obtained from diﬀerent
databases, they may diﬀer in generality (we return to this point in Section 3
below).
Both association rules and functional rules may be ranked according to
three criteria of interest: accuracy, simplicity,a n dgenerality. Each criterion
admits a variety of measures, depending on the speciﬁc model. In the case
of linear regression, it is customary to measure accuracy by R2. Simplicity
is often associated with a low number of variables. That is, the number of
8variables measures the complexity of the rule. Finally, generality might be
measured by the number of observations.
Irrespective of the particular measures used, people generally prefer high
accuracy, low complexity, and high generality. The preference for accuracy is
perhaps the most obvious: rules are supposed to describe the database, and
accuracy is simply the degree to which they succeed in doing so. The prefer-
ence for generality, other things being equal, has obvious pragmatic sources:
a more general rule is more likely to come to bear on future cases. The
preference for simplicity, is, however, somewhat more intriguing. William
of Occam oﬀered simplicity as a guiding normative principle. Wittgenstein
(1922) suggested simplicity as a descriptive criterion, modeling the process
of induction. The preference for simplicity may be viewed as axiomatic, or
as deriving from other principles. For example, simple rules are sometimes
more general than complex rules (though this need not always be the case;
see Gilboa (1994)). Simple rules may be viewed as identifying causal rela-
tionships.8 For example, in the democratic peace example above, one reason
Ann may have been convinced by the democratic peace rule is that she could
construct a causal story of why democratic countries might not go to war
with each other: politicians who are answerable to the public via elections
may be unwilling to go to war unless forced to.9 A causal story that supports
a rule is easier to uncover when there are fewer variables than when there
are more, hence simpler rules will generally be preferred.
Another reason to prefer simplicity is the conﬁdence it provides for predic-
tions beyond the given database. Consider the example of linear regression.
8See Pearl (2000) who bases his theory of causality on simplicity.
9Kant (1795) gave essentially this explanation: “The republican constitution, besides
the purity of its origin (having sprung from the pure source of the concept of law), also
gives a favorable prospect for the desired consequence, i.e., perpetual peace. The reason is
this: if the consent of the citizens is required in order to decide that war should be declared
(and in this constitution it cannot but be the case), nothing is more natural than that
they would be very cautious in commencing such a poor game, decreeing for themselves all
the calamities of war.” Observe that Kant wrote in favor of the republican constitution,
rather than democracy per se.
9For a given accuracy level R2, one generally prefers a small set of variables
t oal a r g e ro n e . 10 It is well known that adding variables to a regression
can only increase R2, and can generically obtain perfect accuracy, that is,
R2 =1when the number of regressors equals n − 1 (where n is the number
of observations). But in this case one tends to feel that the theory (rule)
is as complex as the data, and that, correspondingly, there is no reason for
the theory to have any predictive power outside the given database. Finally,
rules or regularities that employ large numbers of variables may be hard to
remember or to convey to other people.
In this paper we assume that people generally prefer rules that are as
accurate, as simple, and as general as possible. Of course, these three prop-
erties present one with non-trivial trade-oﬀs. In the next section we discuss
functional rules for a given database, ignoring the criterion of generality, and
focus on the accuracy-simplicity trade-oﬀ. We will show that the feasible set
in the accuracy-simplicity space cannot be easily computed. A similar result
can be shown for association rules. We choose to focus on linear regression
for two reasons. First, in economics it is a more common technique for un-
covering rules. Second, our main result is less straightforward in the case of
linear regression.
3 The Complexity of Linear Regression
We devote this section to the study of the trade-oﬀ between simplicity and
accuracy of functional rules in the case of linear regression. While regression
analysis is a basic tool of scientiﬁc research, we here view it as an admittedly
idealized model of non-professional human reasoning.11 Given a set of pre-
dicting variables, one attempts to provide a good ﬁt to a predicted variable.
10This prefence is uncontroversial if “smaller” means “is a subset of”. Yet, we will
assume that this preference also holds when “s m a l l e r ”m e a n s“ h a sf e w e rv a r i a b l e st h a n ” .
11See Bray and Savin (1986), who used regression analysis to model the learning of
economic agents.
10A common measure of accuracy is the coeﬃcient of determination, R2.A
reasonable measure of complexity is the number of explanatory variables one
uses. The “adjusted R2” is frequently used as a measure of the quality of
a regression, trading oﬀ accuracy, simplicity, and generality. Adjusted R2
essentially levies a multiplicative penalty for additional variables to oﬀset
the spurious increase in R2 that results from an increase in the number of
predicting variables. In recent years statisticians and econometricians mostly
use additive penalty functions in model speciﬁcation (choosing the predicting
variables) for a regression problem.12 The diﬀerent penalties are associated
with diﬀerent criteria determining the trade-oﬀ b e t w e e np a r s i m o n ya n dp r e -
cision. Each penalty function can be viewed as deﬁning preferences over
the number of included variables and R2,r e ﬂecting the trade-oﬀ between
simplicity and accuracy. Rather than choose a speciﬁc penalty function, we
assume that an individual can be ascribed a function v : R+ × [0,1] → R
that represents her preferences for simplicity and accuracy, where v(k,r) is
her utility for a regression that attains R2 = r with k explanatory variables.
Thus, if v(·,·) is decreasing in its ﬁrst argument and increasing in the second,
a person who chooses a rule so as to maximize v may be viewed as though
she prefers both simplicity and accuracy, and trades them oﬀ as described
by v.
Our aim is to demonstrate that ﬁnding “good” rules is a diﬃcult com-
putational task. We use the concept of NP-Completeness from computer
science to formalize the notion of diﬃculty of solving problems. A yes/no
problem is NP if it is easy (can be performed in polynomial worst-case time
complexity) to verify that a suggested solution is indeed a solution to it.
When an NP problem is also NP-Complete, there is no known algorithm,
whose (worst-case time) complexity is polynomial, that can solve it. How-
ever, NP-Completeness means somewhat more than the fact that there is no
12See, e.g., Hastie et al. (2001) for a discussion of model speciﬁcation and penalty
functions.
11such known algorithm. The non-existence of such an algorithm is not due to
the fact that the problem is new or that little attention has been devoted to
it. For NP-Complete problems it is known that, if a polynomial algorithm
were found for one of them, such an algorithm could be translated into algo-
rithms for all other problems in NP. Thus, a problem that is NP-Complete
is at least as hard as many problems that have been thoroughly studied for
years by academics, and for which no polynomial algorithm has yet been
found.
We emphasize again that the rules we discuss have no pretense to oﬀer
complete theories, identify causal relationships, provide predictions, or sug-
gest courses of action. Rules are merely regularities that happen to hold in a
given database, and they may be purely coincidental. Rules may be backed
by theories, but we do not purport to model the entire process of developing
and choosing among theories.
Assume that we are trying to predict a variable Y given the explanatory
variables X =( X1,...,Xm).F o r a s u b s e t K of {X1,...,Xm},l e tR2
K be
the value of the coeﬃcient of determination R2 when we regress (yi)i≤n on
(xij)i≤n,j∈K. We assume that the data are given in their entirety, that is,
that there are no missing values.
How does one select a set of explanatory variables? First consider the
feasible set of rules, projected onto the accuracy-complexity space. For a set
of explanatory variables K, let the degree of complexity be k = |K| and a
degree of accuracy — r = R2. Consider the k-r space and, for a given database
X =( X1,...,Xm) and a variable Y ,d e n o t eb yF(X,Y) the set of pairs (k,r)
for which there exists a rule with these parameters. Because the set F(X)
is only deﬁned for integer values of k, and for certain values of r,i ti sm o r e
convenient to visualize its comprehensive closure deﬁned by:
F 0(X,Y) ≡ {(k,r) ∈ R+ × [0,1]|∃(k0,r 0) ∈ F(X,Y),k≥ k0,r≤ r0 }
12The set F0(X,Y) is schematically illustrated in Figure 1. Note that it
need not be convex.
_________________________
Insert Figure 1 about here
_________________________
The optimization problem that such a person with utility function v(·,·)
f a c e si sd e p i c t e di nF i g u r e2 .
_________________________
Insert Figure 2 about here
_________________________
This optimization problem is hard to solve, because one generally cannot
know its feasible set. In fact, for every r>0,g i v e nX,Y,k, determining
whether (k,r) ∈ F 0(X,Y) is computationally hard:
Theorem 1 For every r ∈ (0,1], the following problem is NP-Complete:
Given explanatory variables X =( X1,...,X m),av a r i a b l eY , and an integer
k ≥ 1,i st h e r eas u b s e tK of {X1,...,Xm} such that |K| ≤ k and R2
K ≥ r?
Theorem 1 explains why people may be surprised to learn of simple regu-
larities that exist in a database they have access to. A person who has access
to the data should, in principle, be able to assess the veracity of all linear
theories pertaining to these data. Yet, due to computational complexity, this
capability remains theoretical. In practice one may often ﬁnd that one has
overlooked a simple linear regularity that, once pointed out, seems evident.
Our discussion here presupposes a ﬁxed database X. In reality, however,
one may have to choose among prediction rules that were obtained given
diﬀerent databases. For example, assume that two researchers collected data
13in an attempt to predict a variable Y . Researcher A collected 1,000 observa-
tions of the variables W, Z,a n dY , and obtained R2 = .9 (for Y regressed on
W and Z). Researcher B collected two observations of the variables T and
Y and, quite expectedly, obtained R2 =1(for Y regressed on T). Observe
that the two databases cannot be combined into a single database, since
they contain information regarding diﬀerent variables.13 Which prediction
rule should we use?
While database A suggests a rule that is both less accurate and more
complex than the rule suggested by database B, one would be expected to
prefer the former to the latter. Indeed, obtaining R2 = .9 with two variables
and 1,000 observations is a much more impressive feat than obtaining a per-
fect ﬁt with one variable and two observations. Rules should be accurate and
simple, but also general. Other things being equal, a rule that has a higher
degree of generality, or a larger scope of applicability, is preferred to a rule
that was found to hold in a smaller database. With a given database, all pre-
diction rules have the same scope of applicability, and thus this criterion may
be suppressed from the rule selection problem. Yet, in a more general set-up,
we should expect accuracy and simplicity to be traded oﬀ with generality as
well.
We show that, for any positive value of r, it is hard to determine whether
ag i v e nk is in the r-cut of F0(X,Y) when the input is (X,Y,k). By contrast,
for a given k, computing the k-cut of F0(X,Y) is a polynomial problem (when
t h ei n p u ti s(X,Y,r)), bounded by a polynomial of degree k. Recall, however,
that k is bounded only by the number of columns in X. Moreover, even if
k is small, a polynomial of degree k may assume large values if m is large.14
13To be precise, a combination of the databases would result in a database with many
missing values. Indeed, a theory of induction that is general enough to encompass data-
bases with missing values will be able to deal with induction given diﬀerent databases as
well.
14The number of observations, n, directly aﬀects the computational complexity of the
regression analysis for every subset of k variables. If n is smaller than k +1 ,w ew o u l d
expect, generically, that any k variables will provide a perfect ﬁt, so that r =1will be
14We conclude that, in general, ﬁnding the frontier of the set F0(X,Y),a sa
function of X and Y , is a hard problem. The optimization problem depicted
in Figure 2 has a fuzzy feasible set, as described in Figure 3.
_________________________
Insert Figure 3 about here
_________________________
A decision maker may choose a functional rule that maximizes v(k,r) out
of all the rules she is aware of, but the latter are likely to constitute only a
subset of the set of rules deﬁning the actual set F 0(X,Y). Hence, many of
the rules that people formulate are not necessarily the simplest (for a given
degree of accuracy) or the most accurate (for a given degree of complexity).
We conclude this section with the observation that one may prove theo-
rems similar to Theorem 1, which would make explicit reference to a certain
function v(k,r). The following is an example of such a theorem.
Theorem 2 For every r ∈ (0,1], the following problem is NP-Complete:
Given explanatory variables X =( X1,...,Xm) and a variable Y ,i st h e r ea
subset K of {X1,...,X m} that obtains an adjusted R2 of at least r?
As will be clear from the proof of Theorem 2, this result does not de-
pend on the speciﬁc measure of the accuracy-simplicity trade-oﬀ, and similar
results can be proven for a variety of functions v(k,r).15
obtained in time O(k).
15There are, however, functions v for which the result does not hold. For example,
consider v(k,r)=m i n ( r,2 − k). This function obtains its maximum at k =1and it is
therefore easy to maximize it.
154 Discussion
4.1 The relevance of NP-Completeness
We maintain that a problem that is NP-Complete will be hard for economic
agents to solve. Agents may obtain or learn the optimal solutions to particu-
lar instances of the general problem, especially if they are only interested in
instances described by small inputs. But should economic agents encounter
new instances of reasonable sizes on a regular basis, high computational com-
plexity implies that it is unlikely to assume that all or most agents in the
economy would determine the optimal solutions to these instances.
In the case of fact-free learning, economic agents are called upon to ﬁnd
regularities in large databases. These regularities cannot be uncovered once
and for all. The economic and political environment changes constantly
and the lore of yesterday does not provide a blueprint for the decisions of
tomorrow. It is therefore reasonable to model economic agents as problem
solvers who constantly need to cope with new and large problems.
O n ec a na r g u et h a tN P - C o m p l e t e n e s si sac o n c e p tt h a tr e l a t e st ot h ew a y
computers perform computations, and has little or no bearing on human rea-
soning. Indeed, there are problems such as natural language understanding
or face recognition that toddlers perform better than do computers. But
these are problems for which ﬁnding an appropriate mathematical model is a
major part of the solution. By contrast, for well deﬁned combinatorial prob-
lems such as those in the class NP it is rarely the case that humans perform
better than do computers. It therefore seems safe to assume that neither
people nor computers can solve NP-Complete problems optimally.
W ed on o tc l a i mt h a tt h eh u m a nb r a i ni sam a c h i n et h a tc a nb em i m i c k e d
by a Turing machine, in theory or in practice. Our proposition is much more
modest: if a well-deﬁned, combinatorial problem is NP-Complete, then it is
probably hard to solve for human beings (for moderate size inputs). This
proposition does not imply that the human brain is a machine, let alone a
16machine that one may simulate on a digital computer.
Since we do not know what the brain actually does, it is still possible that
the brain can eﬃciently solve problems that are NP-Complete. That is, one
cannot rule out the possibility that a statistician or an economist would have
an uncanny ability to ﬁnd an optimal set of k regressors (for every problem
and every k). But even if this were the case, they would not be able to share
this ability: any description of a procedure by which one may optimally solve
t h ep r o b l e mw o u l dg i v er i s e( b yC h u r c h ’ st h e s i s 16)t oaT u r i n gm a c h i n et h a t
can mimic this procedure. Hence, should a human being have such magical
ability, it would not be transferable.
One may question the use of complexity concepts that are deﬁned by
worst-case analysis. Indeed, why would we worry about an algorithm whose
worst-case performance is exponential, if it is polynomial on average? Expe-
rience of computer scientists, however, indicates that NP-Complete problems
do not tend to be eﬃciently solvable even in expectation, under any reason-
able assumptions on the distribution of inputs.17
As all problems in NP, the problems we study have only two possible
answers: “yes” or “no”.18 But as is often the case, they are binary manifes-
tations of optimization problems, say “Find the minimal number k of regres-
sors that obtain an R2 of r”, or “Find a set of regressors that maximize the
adjusted R2”. When our problems are formulated thus, it is natural to ask
whether one can ﬁnd approximations to the optimal solution. For example,
if one can ﬁnd, in polynomial time, a set of regressors that is guaranteed not
to be more than 2% away from the highest possible adjusted R2,o n em a yb e
16See Odifreddi (1989) on the Turing-Church theses and the diﬀerent variants thereof.
17See Papadimitriou (1994) who makes this point, and emphasizes that the example
of linear programming conﬁrms this experience. Indeed, the simplex algorithm has ex-
ponential worst-case time complexity but very good expected complexity. Yet, linear
programming is not an NP-Complete problem and it now has algorithms with polynomial
worst-case performance.
18These are called “decision problems” in the computer science literature. For econo-
mists, this term is quite misleading.
17content with this result. We do not know whether there exists polynomial
algorithms that guarantee such approximations.19.
We do not claim that the inability to solve NP-Complete problems is
necessarily the most important cognitive limitation on people’s ability to
perform induction. As mentioned above, even polynomial problems can be
diﬃcult to solve when the database consists of many cases and many at-
tributes. Moreover, it is often the case that looking for a general rule does
not even cross someone’s mind. Yet, the diﬃculty of performing induction
shares an important property with NP-Complete problems: while it is hard
to come up with a solution to such a problem, it is easy to verify whether a
suggested solution is valid. Similarly, it is hard to come up with an appropri-
ate generalization, but it is relatively easy to assess the applicability of such
a generalization once it is oﬀered.
We need not assume that people are lazy or irrational to explain why
they do not ﬁnd all relevant rules. Rather, looking for simple regularities
is a genuinely hard problem. There is nothing irrational about not being
able to solve NP-Complete problems. Faced with the problem of selecting a
set of explanatory variables, which is NP-Complete, people may use various
heuristics to ﬁnd prediction rules, but they cannot be sure, in general, that
the rules they ﬁnd are the simplest ones.
19A related problem is the satisfaction of a system of linear equalities and inequalities
by a minimal number of variables (obtaining non-zero values). Amaldi and Kann (1998)
showed that no polynomial algorithm can compute approximations to this problems (unless
all problems in NP are polynomial). However, in our case a reasonable deﬁnition of
approximation will also use the r axis. Generally, all NP-Complete problems are equivalent
to each other in the sense that the existence of a polynomial algorithm that perfectly solves
o n eo ft h e mi m p l i e st h ee x i s t e n c eo fs u c ha na l gorithm for all others. But the existence of
a polynomial algorithm that approximates (the optimization version of) one such problem
does not imply a similar result for other problems. See Papadimitriou (1994, Ch. 13).
184.2 Implications
Agreeing to disagree. Our model suggests two reasons for which people, who
have access to the same database, may have diﬀerent beliefs, even if these
beliefs are deﬁned by rules that are derived from the shared database. First,
two people may notice diﬀerent regularities. Since ﬁnding the “best” regular-
ities is a hard problem, we should not be surprised if one person failed to see
a regularity that another came up with. Second, even if the individuals share
the rules that they found, they may entertain diﬀerent beliefs if they make
diﬀerent trade-oﬀs between the accuracy and the simplicity of rules. Diﬀerent
people may well have diﬀerent v functions, with some people more willing to
sacriﬁce accuracy for simpler rules. If two individuals choose diﬀerent levels
of simplicity, they may also disagree on the relevance of a characteristic. In
particular, a variable that is important when there are relatively few other
variables in a regression may not be important if the number of variables
considered increases. Thus, a particular attribute may play a large role in
the rule one person uses but no role in the rule another employs.
Locally optimal rules. Our central point is that people use rules that are not
fully optimal because of the complexity of the problem of ﬁnding such rules.
When an individual uses a rule that is less than fully optimal, she may im-
prove upon the rule by considering alternatives to it. A person faced with the
regression problem may think of alternatives to her current “best” regression
by adding or deleting variables from her current included set, or by replacing
variables in the included set with others. While we do not formally model
this search and revision process, one can imagine two distinct ways people
may update the rules they use. One can search “locally”, that is, consider
relatively minor changes in the current rule such as adding, deleting, or re-
placing one or two variables, or one can search globally by considering sets
of variables that have no relation whatsoever to the current set of variables.
Local search may ﬁnd local optima that are not global optima. Diﬀerently
put, people may get “stuck” with suboptimal rules that can be improved
19upon only with a “paradigm shift” that considers a completely diﬀerent way
of looking at a problem.
Path dependence. When individuals search locally for improved rules, their
reasoning is likely to exhibit path dependence. Two individuals who begin
with diﬀerent initial sets of variables can settle on very diﬀerent rules, even
after very long search times.
Regret. Our model suggests diﬀerent notions of regret. In a standard model,
individuals make optimal choices given the information available to them at
the time they decide. In a stochastic environment, an individual may wish
ex post that she had decided diﬀerently. However, a rational person has no
reason to regret a decision she had taken since she could have done no better
at the time of her decision, given the information available to her at that time.
In our model there are two notions in which information can be “given”, and
correspondingly, two possible sources of regret. As usual, one may learn the
realization of a random variable, and wish that she had decided diﬀerently.
But one can also learn of a rule that one has not been aware of, even though
the rule could be derived, in principle, from one’s database. Should one feel
regret as a result? As argued above, one could not be expected to solve NP-
Complete problems, and therefore it may be argued that one could not have
chosen optimally. Yet, one might expect individuals to experience a stronger
sense of “I could have known” as a result of ﬁnding rules that hold in a given
database, than as a result of getting new observations.
4.3 Modeling choices
There is an alternative approach to modelling induction that potentially pro-
vides a more explicit account of the components of cases. The components
should include entities and relations among them. For example, our moti-
vating examples give rise to entities such as countries and governments, and
to the relations “fought against” and “exhibits inferior performance”, among
others. In a formal model, entities would be elements of an abstract set, and
20relations, or predicates, would be modeled as functions from sequences of en-
tities into [0,1]. Such a predicate model would provide more structure, would
be closer to the way people think of complex problems, and would allow a
more intuitive modelling of analogies than one can obtain from our present
model. Moreover, while the mathematical notation required to describe a
predicate model is more cumbersome than that used for the present model,
the description of actual problems within the predicate model may be more
concise. In particular, this implies that problems that are computationally
easy in the attribute model may still be computationally hard with respect
to the predicate model.20
Observe that neither the model presented here nor the alternative predi-
cate model attempts to explain how people choose the predicates or attributes
they use to describe cases. The importance of this choice has been clearly
illustrated by Goodman’s (1965) “grue-bleen” paradox.21 This problem is,
however, beyond the scope of the present paper.
4.4 Related literature
Most of the formal literature in economic theory and in related ﬁelds adheres
to the Bayesian model of information processing. In this model a decision
maker starts out with a prior probability, and she updates it in the face of new
information by Bayes’s rule. Hence, this model can easily capture changes in
20In Aragones, Gilboa, Postlewaite and Schmeidler (2001), we present both the attribute
and the predicate models for the study of analogies, prove their equivalence in terms of
the scope of phenomena they can describe, and show that ﬁnding a good analogy in the
predicate model is a hard problem.
21The paradox is, in a nutshell, the following. If one wishes to test whether emeralds are
green or blue, one can sample emeralds and conclude that they seem to be green. Based on
this, one may predict that emeralds will be green in the year 2010. Next assume that one
starts with two other primitive predicates, “grue” and “bleen”. When translated to the
more common predicates “green” and “blue”, “grue” means “green until 2010 and blue
thereafter” and “bleen” — vice versa. With these predicates, emeralds appear to be grue,
and one may conclude that they will appear blue after the year 2010. This paradox may
be interpreted as showing that inductive inference, as well as the concept of simplicity,
depend on the predicates one starts out with.
21o p i n i o nt h a tr e s u l tf r o mn e wi n f o r m a t i o n .B u ti td oe sn o td e a lv e r yg r a c i o u s l y
with changes of opinion that are not driven by new information. In fact, in a
Bayesian model with perfect rationality people cannot change their opinions
unless new information has been received. It follows that the example we
started out with cannot be explained by such models.
Relaxing the perfect rationality assumption, one may attempt to provide a
pseudo-Bayesian account of the phenomena discussed here. For instance, one
can use a space of states of the world to describe the subjective uncertainty
that a decision maker has regarding the result of a computation, before this
computation is carried out. (See Anderlini and Felli (1994) and Al-Najjar,
Casadesus-Masanell, and Ozdenoren (1999).) In such a model, one would be
described as if one entertained a prior probability of, say p,t h a t“ d e m o c r a t i c
peace” holds. Upon hearing the rhetorical question as in our dialogue, the
decision maker performs the computation of the accuracy of this rule, and is
described as if the result of this computation were new information.
A related approach employs a subjective state space to provide a Bayesian
account of unforeseen contingencies. (See Kreps (1979, 1992), and Dekel,
Lipman, and Rustichini (1997, 1998).) Should this approach be applied to the
problem of induction, each regularity that might hold in the database would
be viewed as an unforeseen contingency that might arise. A decision maker’s
behavior will then be viewed as arising from Bayesian optimization with
respect to a subjective state space that reﬂects her subjective uncertainty.
Our approach models the process of induction more explicitly. In com-
parison with pseudo-Bayesian approaches, it allows a better understanding
of why and when induction is likely to be a hard problem.
Gilboa and Schmeidler (2001) oﬀer a theory of case-based decision mak-
ing. They argue that cases are the primitive objects of knowledge, and that
rules and probabilities are derived from cases. Moreover, rules and probabili-
ties cannot be known in the same sense, and to the same degree of certitude,
that cases can. Yet, rules and probabilities may be eﬃcient and insight-
22ful ways of succinctly summarizing many cases. The present paper suggests
that summarizing databases by rules may involve loss of information, because
one cannot be guaranteed to ﬁnd the “optimal” rules that a given database
induces.
235 Appendix: Proofs
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m1 :
Let there be given r>0. It is easy to see that the problem is in NP:
given a suggested set K ⊂ {1,...,m},o n em a yc a l c u l a t eR2
K in polynomial
time in |K|n (which is bounded by the size of the input, (m +1 ) n).22 To
show that the problem is NP-Complete, we use a reduction of the following
problem, which is known to be NP-Complete (see Gary and Johnson (1979),
or Papadimitriou (1994)):
Problem EXACT COVER: Given a set S, a set of subsets of S, S,
are there pairwise disjoint subsets in S whose union equals S?
(That is, does a subset of S constitutes a partition of S?)
Given a set S, a set of subsets of S, S, we will generate n observations of
(m+1)variables, (xij)i≤n,j≤m and (yi)i≤n,a n dan a t u r a ln u m b e rk, such that
S has an exact cover in S iﬀ there is a subset K of {1,...,m} with |K| ≤ k
and R2
K ≥ r.
Let there be given, then, S and S. Assume without loss of generality that
S = {1,...,s},a n dt h a tS = {S1,...,Sl} (where s,l ≥ 1 are natural numbers).
We construct n =2 ( s + l +1 )observations of m =2 l predicting variables.
It will be convenient to denote the 2l predicting variables by X1,...,Xl and
Z1,...,Zl and the predicted variable — by Y . Their corresponding values will
be denoted (xij)i≤n,j≤l, (zij)i≤n,j≤l,a n d(yi)i≤n.W e w i l l u s e Xj,Z j, and
Y also to denote the column vectors (xij)i≤n, (zij)i≤n,a n d(yi)i≤n, respec-
tively. Let M ≥ 0 be a constant to be speciﬁed later. We now specify the
vectors X1,...,Xl, Z1,...,Zl,a n dY as a function of M.
For i ≤ s and j ≤ l, xij =1if i ∈ Sj and xij =0if i/ ∈ Sj;
For i ≤ s and j ≤ l, zij =0 ;
22Here and in the sequel we assume that reading an entry in the matrix X or in the
vector Y , as well any algebraic computation require a single time unit. Our results hold
also if one assumes that xij and yi are all rational and takes into account the time it takes
to read and manipulate these numbers.
24For s<i≤ s + l and j ≤ l, xij = zij =1if i = s + j and xij = zij =0if
i 6= s + j;
For j ≤ l, xs+l+1,j = zs+l+1,j =0 ;
For i ≤ s + l, yi =1and ys+l+1 = M;
For i>s+ l +1 , yi = −yi−(s+l+1) and for all j ≤ l, xij = −xi−(s+l+1),j
and zij = −zi−(s+l+1),j.
Observe that the bottom half of the matrix X as well as the bottom half
of the vector Y are the negatives of the respective tops halves. This implies
that each of the variables X1,...,Xl, Z1,...,Zl,a n dY has a mean of zero.
This, in turns, implies that for any set of variables K, when we regress Y on
K, we get a regression equation with a zero intercept.
Consider the matrix X and the vector Y obtained by the above construc-
tion for diﬀerent values of M. Observe that the collection of sets K that
maximize R2
K is independent of M. Hence, it is useful to deﬁne b R2
K as the
R2 obtained from regressing Y on K, ignoring observations s + l +1and
2(s + l +1 ) . Obviously, minimizing b R2
K is tantamount to minimizing R2
K.
We claim that there is a subset K of {X1,...,X l}∪{Z1,...,Zl} with |K| ≤
k ≡ l for which b R2
K =1iﬀ S has an exact cover from S.
First assume that such a cover exists. That is, assume that there is a set
J ⊂ {1,...,l} such that {Sj}j∈J constitutes a partition of S.T h i sm e a n st h a t
P
j∈J 1Sj = 1S where 1A is the indicator function of a set A.L e tα be the
intercept, (βj)j≤l be the coeﬃcients of (Xj)j≤l and (γj)j≤l —o f(Zj)j≤l in the
regression. Set α =0 .F o rj ∈ J, set βj =1and γj =0 ,a n df o rj/ ∈ J set




j≤l γjZj = Y where







j≤l βjxij = yi =1
follows from
P





j≤l γjzij = βj + γj = yi =1
25follows from our construction (assigning precisely one of {βj,γj} to 1 and




j≤l γjznj =0=yi =0 .
The number of variables used in this regression is l. Speciﬁcally, choose
K = {Xj |j ∈ J } ∪ {Zj |j/ ∈ J },w i t h|K| = l, and observe that b R2
K =1 .
We now turn to the converse direction. Assume, then, that there is a
subset K of {X1,...,Xl} ∪{Z1,...,Zl} with |K| ≤ l for which b R2
K =1 .S i n c e
all variables have zero means, this regression has an intercept of zero (α =0
in the notation above). Let J ⊂ {1,...,l} be the set of indices of the X
variables in K, i.e., {Xj}j∈J = K ∩ {X1,...,Xl}.W ew i l ls h o wt h a t{Sj}j∈J
constitutes a partition of S.S e tL ⊂ {1,...,l} be the set of indices of the Z
variables in K, i.e., {Zj}j∈L = K ∩ {Z1,...,Zl}. Consider the coeﬃcients of
the variables in K used in the regression obtaining b R2
K =1 .D e n o t et h e mb y





j≤l γjZj = Y .
We argue that βj =1for every j ∈ J and γj =1for every j ∈ L.T o
see this, observe ﬁrst that for every j ≤ l,t h es +j observation implies that
βj + γj =1 .T h i s m e a n s t h a t f o r e v e r y j ≤ l, βj 6=0or γj 6=0(this also
implies that either j ∈ J or j ∈ L). If for some j both βj 6=0and γj 6=0 ,
we will have |K| >l , a contradiction. Hence for every j ≤ l either βj 6=0or
γj 6=0 , but not both. (In other words, J = Lc.) This also implies that the
non-zero coeﬃcient out of {βj,γj} has to be 1.
Thus the cardinality of K is precisely l,a n dt h ec o e ﬃcients {βj,γj} deﬁne
a subset of {S1,...S l}:i fβj =1and γj =0 , i.e., j ∈ J, Sj is included in the
subset, and if βj =0and γj =1 , i.e., j/ ∈ J, Sj is not included in the subset.
That this subset {Sj}j∈J constitutes a partition of S follows from the ﬁrst s
observations as above.
We now turn to deﬁne M.W ew i s ht od os oi ns u c haw a yt h a t ,f o re v e r y
set of explanatory variables K, R2
K ≥ r iﬀ b R2
K =1 . Fix a set K.D e n o t eb y
26[ SSR and [ SST the explained variance and the total variance, respectively, of
the regression of Y on K without observations s+l+1and 2(s+l+1),w h e r e
SSR and SST denote the variances of the regression with all observations.
Thus, R2
K = SSR/SST and b R2
K = [ SSR/[ SST.O b s e r v et h a t[ SST =2 ( s+l)
and SST =2 ( s + l)+2 M2.A l s o ,SSR = [ SSR is independent of M.
Note that if K is such that b R2
K =1 ,t h e n(SSR =)[ SSR = [ SST =2 ( s+l).
In this case, R2
K =
2(s+l)
2(s+l)+2M2.I f ,h o w e v e r ,K is such that b R2
K < 1,t h e nw e
argue that (SSR =)[ SSR ≤ [ SST − 1
9. Assume not. That is, assume that K
is such that [ SSR > [ SST − 1
9. This implies that on each of the observations
1,...,s+l,s+l +2,...,2(s+l)+1,t h eﬁt produced by K is at most 1
3 away
from yi. Then for every j ≤ l, |βj +γj −1| < 1
3.H e n c ef o re v e r yj ≤ l either
βj 6=0or γj 6=0 , but not both, and the non-zero coeﬃcient out of {βj,γj}
has to be in (2
3, 4
3). But then, considering the ﬁrst s observations, we ﬁnd
that K is an exact cover. It follows that, if b R2



















2(s+l)+2M2, and observe that for this M,t h e r ee x i s t saK
such that R2
K ≥ r iﬀ there exists a K for which b R2
K =1 ,t h a ti s ,i ﬀ K is an
exact cover.
To conclude the proof, it remains to observe that the construction of the
variables (Xj)j≤l, (Zj)j≤l,a n dY can be done in polynomial time in the size
of the input. ¤
Proof of Theorem 2:
Let there be given r>0. The proof follows that of Theorem 1 with the
following modiﬁcation. For an integer t ≥ 1, to be speciﬁed later, we add
t observations for which all the variables ((Xj)j≤l, (Zj)j≤l,a n dY ) assume
the value 0. These observations do not change the R2 obtained by any set
of regressors, as both SST and SSR remain the same. Assuming that t has
been ﬁxed (and that it polynomial in the data), let r0 be the R2 corresponding
to an adjusted R2 of r,w i t hl regressors. That is, (1−r0)=( 1−r)t+2s+2l+1
t+2s+l+1 .
27Deﬁne M as in the proof of Theorem 1 for r0.
We claim that there exists a set of regressors that obtains an adjusted R2
of r iﬀ there exists a set of l regressors that obtains an R2 of r0 (hence, iﬀ
there exists an exact cover in the original problem). The “if” part is obvious
from our construction. Consider the “only if” part. Assume, then that a
set of regressors obtains an adjusted R2 of r.I fi th a sl regressors, the same
calculation shows that it obtains the desired R2. We now argue that if no
set of l regressors obtains an adjusted R2 of r, then no set of regressors (of
any cardinality) obtains an adjusted R2 of r.
Consider ﬁrst a set K0 with |K0| = k0 >lregressors. Observe that, by
t h ec h o i c eo fM, r0 is the upper bound on all R2
K for all K with |K| = l,a sr0
was computed assuming that an exact cover exists, and that, therefore, there
are l variables that perfectly match all the observations but s + l +1and
2(s + l +1 ) . Due to the structure of the problem, r0 is also an upper bound
on R2
K for all K with |K| ≥ l.T h i si ss ob e c a u s et h eo n l yo b s e r v a t i o n st h a t
are not perfectly matched (in the hypothesized l-regressor set) correspond to
zero values of the regressors. It follows that the adjusted R2 for K0 is lower
than r.
Next consider a set K0 with |K0| = k0 <lregressors. For such a set there
exists a j ≤ l such that neither Xj nor Zj are in K0. Hence, observations
s + j and 2s + l + j +1cannot be matched by the regression on K0.T h e
lowest possible SSE in this problem, corresponding to the hypothesized set
of l regressors, is 2M2. This means that the SSE of K0 is at least 2M2 +2 .
That is, the SSE of the set K0 is at least M2+1
M2 larger than the SSE used
for the calculation of r. On the other hand, K0 uses less variables. But if
t+2s+l+1
t+2s+k+1 < M2+1
M2 , the reduction in the number of variables cannot pay oﬀ,
and K0 has an adjusted R2 lower than r.I tr e m a i n st oc h o o s et large enough
so that the above inequality holds, and to observe that this t is bounded by
the polynomial of the input size.¤
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